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Abstract
We study the contextual linear bandit problem, a version of the standard stochastic
multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem where a learner sequentially selects actions
to maximize a reward which depends also on a user provided per-round context.
Though the context is chosen arbitrarily or adversarially, the reward is assumed to be
a stochastic function of a feature vector that encodes the context and selected action.
Our goal is to devise private learners for the contextual linear bandit problem.
We first show that using the standard definition of differential privacy results in
linear regret. So instead, we adopt the notion of joint differential privacy, where we
assume that the action chosen on day t is only revealed to user t and thus needn’t be
kept private that day, only on following days. We give a general scheme converting
the classic linear-UCB algorithm into a joint differentially private algorithm using
the tree-based algorithm [10, 18]. We then apply either Gaussian noise or Wishart
noise to achieve joint-differentially private algorithms and bound the resulting
algorithms’ regrets. In addition, we give the first lower bound on the additional
regret any private algorithms for the MAB problem must incur.
1 Introduction
The well-known stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) is a sequential decision-making task in which
a learner repeatedly chooses an action (or arm) and receives a noisy reward. The objective is to
maximize cumulative reward by exploring the actions to discover optimal ones (having the best
expected reward), balanced with exploiting them. The contextual bandit problem is an extension of
the MAB problem, where the learner also receives a context in each round, and the expected reward
depends on both the context and the selected action.
As a motivating example, consider online shopping: the user provides a context (composed of query
words, past purchases, etc.), and the website responds with a suggested product and receives a reward
if the user buys it. Ignoring the context and modeling the problem as a standard MAB (with an action
for each possible product) suffers from the drawback of ignoring the variety of users’ preferences;
whereas separately learning each user’s preferences doesn’t allow us to generalize between users.
Therefore it is common to model the task as a contextual linear bandit problem: Based on the
user-given context, each action is mapped to a feature vector; the reward probability is then assumed
to depend on the same unknown linear function of the feature vector across all users.
The above example motivates the need for privacy in the contextual bandit setting: users’ past
purchases and search queries are sensitive personal information, yet they strongly predict future
purchases. In this work, we give upper and lower bounds for the problem of (joint) differentially private
contextual linear bandits. Differential privacy is the de facto gold standard of privacy-preserving
data analysis in both academia and industry, requiring that an algorithm’s output have very limited
dependency on any single user interaction (one context and reward). However, as we later illustrate,
adhering to the standard notion of differential privacy (under event-level continual observation) in
the contextual bandit requires us to essentially ignore the context and thus incur linear regret. We
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therefore adopt the more relaxed notion of joint differential privacy [23] which, intuitively, allows us
to present the t-th user with products corresponding to her preferences, while guaranteeing that all
interactions with all users at times t ′ > t have very limited dependence on user t’s preferences. The
guarantee of differential privacy under continuous observation assures us that even if all later users
collude in an effort to learn user t’s context or preference, they still have very limited advantage over a
random guess.
1.1 Problem Formulation
Stochastic Contextual Linear Bandits. In the classic MAB, in every round t a learner selects
an action at from a fixed set A and receives a reward yt . In the (stationary) stochastic MAB, the
reward is noisy with a fixed but unknown expectation E[yt | at ] that depends only on the selected
action. In the stochastic contextual bandit problem, before each round the learner also receives
a context ct ∈ C — the expected reward E[yt | ct, at ] depends on both ct and at . It is common
to assume that the context affects the reward in a linear way: map every context-action pair to a
feature vector φ(c, a) ∈ Rd (where φ is an arbitrary but known function) and assume that E[yt |
ct, at ] = 〈θ∗, φ(ct, at )〉. The vector θ∗ ∈ Rd is the key unknown parameter of the environment which
the learner must discover to maximize reward. Alternatively, we say that on every round the learner
is given a decision set Dt B {φ(ct, a) | a ∈ A} of all the pre-computed feature vectors: choosing
xt ∈ Dt effectively determines the action at ∈ A. Thus, the contextual stochastic linear bandit
framework consists of repeated rounds in which the learner: (i) receives a decision set Dt ⊂ Rd;
(ii) chooses an action xt ∈ Dt ; and (iii) receives a stochastic reward yt = 〈θ∗, xt〉 + ηt . When all the
Dt are identical and consist of the standard basis vectors, the problem reduces to standard MAB.
The learner’s objective is to maximize cumulative reward, which is equivalent to minimizing regret: the
extra reward a learner would have received by always choosing the best available action. In other words,
the regret characterizes the cost of having to learn the optimal action over just knowing it beforehand.
For stochastic problems, we are usually interested in a related quantity called pseudo-regret, which is
the extra expected reward that the learner could have earned if it had known θ∗ in advance. In our
setting, the cumulative pseudo-regret after n rounds is R̂n B
∑n
t=1 maxx∈Dt 〈θ∗, x − xt〉.1
Joint Differential Privacy. As discussed above, the context and reward may be considered private
information about the users which we wish to keep private from all other users. We thus introduce
the notion of jointly differentially private learners under continuous observation, a combination of
two definitions [given in 23, 18]. First, we say two sequences S = 〈(D1, y1), (D2, y2), . . . , (Dn, yn)〉
and S′ = 〈(D ′1, y′1), . . . , (D ′n, y′n)〉 are t-neighbors if for all t ′ , t it holds that (Dt′, yt′) = (D ′t′, y′t′).
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm A for the contextual bandit problem is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially
private (JDP) under continual observation if for any t and any pair of t-neighboring sequences S and
S′, and any subset S>t ⊂ Dt+1 × Dt+2 × · · · × Dn of sequence of actions ranging from day t + 1 to
the end of the sequence, it holds that P(A(S) ∈ S>t ) ≤ eεP(A(S′) ∈ S′>t ) + δ.
The standard notion of differential privacy under continual observation would require that changing
the context ct cannot have much effect on the probability of choosing action at — even for round t
itself (not just for future rounds as with JDP). In our problem formulation, however, changing ct to c′t
may change the decision set Dt to a possibly disjoint D ′t , making that notion ill-defined. Therefore,
when we discuss the impossibility of regret-minimization under standard differential privacy in
Section 5, we revert back to a fixed action set A with an explicit per-round context ct .
1.2 Our Contributions and Paper Organization
In this work, in addition to formulating the definition of JDP under continual observation, we also
present a framework for implementing JDP algorithms for the contextual linear bandit problem. Not
surprisingly, our framework combines a tree-based privacy algorithm [10, 18] with a linear upper
confidence bound (LinUCB) algorithm [13]. For modularity, in Section 3 we analyze a family of linear
UCB algorithms that use different regularizers in every round, under the premise that the regularizers
1The pseudo-regret ignores the stochasticity of the reward but not the resulting randomness in the learner’s
choice of actions. It equals the regret in expectation, but is more amenable to high-probability bounds such as
ours. In particular, in some cases we can achieve polylog(n) bounds on pseudo-regret because, unlike regret, it
doesn’t have added regret noise of variance Ω(n).
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are PSD with bounded singular values. Moreover, we repeat our analysis twice — first we obtain
a general O˜(√n) upper bound on regret; then, for problem instances that maintain a ∆ reward gap
separating the optimal and sub-optimal actions, we obtain a polylog(n)/∆ regret upper bound. Our
leading application of course is privacy, though one could postulate other reasons where such changing
regularizers would be useful (e.g., if parameter estimates turn out to be wrong and have to be updated).
We then plug two particular regularizers into our scheme: the first is a privacy-preserving mechanism
that uses additive Wishart noise [30] (which is always PSD); the second uses additive Gaussian
noise [19] (shifted to make it PSD w.h.p. over all rounds). The main term in the two regret bounds
obtained by both algorithms is O˜(√n · d3/4/√ε) (the bound itself depends on numerous parameters, a
notation-list given in Section 2). Details of both techniques appear in Section 4. Experiments with a
few variants of our algorithms are detailed in Section D of the supplementary material. In Section 5
we also give a lower bound for the ε-differentially private MAB problem. Whereas all previous work
on the private MAB problem uses standard (non-private) bounds, we show that any private algorithm
must incur an additional regret of Ω(k log(n)/ε). While the result resembles the lower bound in the
adversarial setting, the proof technique cannot rely on standard packing arguments [e.g. 20] since
the input for the problem is stochastic rather than adversarial. Instead, we rely on a recent coupling
argument [22] to prove any private algorithm must substantially explore suboptimal arms.
Future Directions. The linear UCB algorithm we adapt in this work is a canonical approach to the
linear bandit problem, using the principle of “optimism in the face of uncertainty.” However, recent
work [24] shows that all such “optimistic” algorithms are sub-optimal, and instead proposes adapting
to the decision set in a particular way by solving an intricate optimization problem. It remains an
open question to devise a private version of this algorithm which interpolates between UCB and
fine-tuning to the specific action set.
1.3 Related Work
MAB and the Contextual Bandit Problem. The MAB dates to the seminal work of Robbins
[28], with the UCB approach developed in a series of works [8, 4] culminating in [6]. Stochastic
linear bandits were formally first introduced in [3], and [5] was the first paper to consider UCB-style
algorithms. An algorithm that is based on a confidence ellipsoid is described by [13], with a variant
based on ridge regression given in [12], or explore-then-commit variant in [29], and a variant related
to a sparse setting appears in [2]. Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [1] gives an instance dependent bound for
linear bandits, which we convert to the contextual setting.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy, first introduced by Dwork et al. [17, 16], is a rigorous
mathematical notion of privacy that requires the probability of any observable output to change very
little when any single datum changes. (We omit the formal definition, having already defined JDP.)
Among its many elegant traits is the notion of group privacy: should k datums change then the change
in the probability of any event is still limited by (roughly) k times the change when a single datum
was changed. Differential privacy also composes: the combination of k (ε, δ)-differentially private
algorithms is
(
O(kε2 + 2√k log(1/δ′)), kδ + δ′)-differentially private for any δ′ > 0 [14].
The notion of differential privacy under continual observation was first defined by Dwork et al. [18]
using the tree-based algorithm [originally appearing in 10]. This algorithm maintains a binary tree
whose n leaves correspond to the n entries in the input sequence. Each node in the tree maintains a
noisy (privacy-preserving) sum of the input entries in its subtree — the cumulative sums of the inputs
can thus be obtained by combining at most log(n) noisy sums. This algorithm is the key ingredient of
a variety of works that deal with privacy in an online setting, including counts [18], online convex
optimization [21], and regret minimization in both the adversarial [31, 34] and stochastic [26, 33]
settings. We comment that Mishra and Thakurta [26] proposed an algorithm similar to our own
for the contextual bandit setting, however (i) without maintaining PSD, (ii) without any analysis,
only empirical evidence, and (iii) without presenting lower bounds. A partial utility analysis of this
algorithm, in the reward-privacy model (where the context’s privacy is not guaranteed), appears in the
recent work of Neel and Roth [27]. Further details about achieving differential privacy via additive
noise and the tree-based algorithm appear in Section A of the supplementary material. The related
problem of private linear regression has also been extensively studied in the offline setting [11, 7].
3
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We use bold letters to denote vectors and bold CAPIT ALS for matrices. Given a d-column matrix
M , its Gram matrix is the (d × d)-matrix M>M . A symmetric matrix M is positive-semidefinite
(PSD, denoted M  0) if x>Mx ≥ 0 for any vector x. Any such M defines a norm on vectors, so we
define ‖x‖2M = x>Mx. We use M  N to mean M − N  0. The Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ2) is
defined by the density function (2piσ2)−1/2 exp(−(x−µ)2/2σ2). The squared L2-norm of a d-dimensional
vector whose coordinates are drawn i.i.d. from N(0, 1) is given by the χ2(d) distribution, which
is tightly concentrated around d. Given two distributions P and Q we denote their total variation
distance by dTV(P,Q) = maxevent E |P(E) −Q(E)|.
Notation. Our bound depends on many parameters of the problem, specified below. Additional
parameters (bounds) are specified in the assumptions stated below.
n horizon, i.e. number of rounds
s, t indices of rounds
d dimensionality of action space
Dt ⊂ Rd; decision set at round t
xt ∈ Dt ; action at round t
yt ∈ R; reward at round t
θ∗ ∈ Rd; unknown parameter vector
m B dlog2(n) + 1e
X<t ∈ R(t−1)×d , with X<t,s = x>s for s < t
Gt Gram matrix of the actions: X><tX<t
Ht regularizer at round t
y<t vector of rewards up to round t − 1
ut action-reward product: X><t y<t
ht perturbation of ut
3 Linear UCB with Changing Regularizers
In this section we introduce and analyze a variation of the well-studied LinUCB algorithm, an
application of the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) idea to stochastic linear bandits [13, 29, 1].
At every round t, LinUCB constructs a confidence set Et that contains the unknown parameter
vector θ∗ with high probability. It then computes an upper confidence bound on the reward of
each action in the decision set Dt , and “optimistically” chooses the action with the highest UCB:
xt ← arg maxx∈Dt UCBt (x), where UCBt (x) B maxθ∈Et 〈θ, x〉. We assume the rewards are linear
with added subgaussian noise (i.e., ys = 〈θ∗, xs〉+ηs for s < t), so it is natural to center the confidence
set Et on the (regularized) linear regression estimate:
θˆt B arg min
θˆ∈Rd
‖X<t θˆ − y<t ‖2 + ‖θˆ ‖2Ht = (Gt + Ht )−1X><t y<t . where Gt B X><tX<t
The matrix Vt B Gt + Ht ∈ Rd×d is a regularized version of the Gram matrix Gt . Whenever the
learner chooses an action vector x ∈ Dt , the corresponding reward gives it some information about
the projection of θ∗ onto x. In other words, the estimate θˆ is probably closer to θ∗ along the directions
where many actions have been taken. This motivates the use of ellipsoidal confidence sets that are
smaller in such directions, inversely corresponding to the eigenvalues of Gt (or Vt ). The ellipsoid is
uniformly scaled by βt to achieve the desired confidence level, as prescribed by Proposition 4.
Et B {θ ∈ Rd | ‖θ − θˆt ‖Vt ≤ βt }, for which UCBt (x) = 〈θˆ, x〉 + βt ‖x‖V−1t . (1)
Just as the changing regularizer Ht perturbs the Gram matrix Gt , our algorithm allows for the vector
ut B X><t y<t to be perturbed by ht to get u˜t B ut + ht . The estimate θˆt is replaced by θ˜t B V−1t u˜t .
Algorithm 1 Linear UCB with Changing Perturbations
Initialize: G1 ← 0d×d , u1 ← 0d .
for each round t = 1, 2, . . . , n do
Receive Dt ← decision set ⊂ Rd .
Receive regularized Vt ← Gt + Ht and perturbed u˜t ← ut + ht
Compute regressor θ˜t ← V−1t u˜t
Compute confidence-set bound βt based on Proposition 4.
Pick action xt ← arg maxx∈Dt 〈θ˜t, x〉 + βt ‖x‖V−1t .
Observe yt ← reward for action xt
Update: Gt+1 ← Gt + xt x>t , ut+1 ← ut + xt yt
end for
Our analysis relies on the following assumptions about the environment and algorithm:
Assumptions (Algorithm 1). For all rounds t = 1, . . . , n and actions x ∈ Dt :
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1. Bounded action set: ‖x‖ ≤ L.
2. Bounded mean reward: |〈θ∗, x〉| ≤ B with B ≥ 1.2
3. Bounded target parameter: ‖θ∗‖ ≤ S.
4. All regularizers are PSD Ht  0.
5. yt = 〈θ∗, xt〉 + ηt where ηt is σ2-conditionally subgaussian on previous actions and rewards,
i.e.: E[exp(ληt ) | x1, y1, . . . , xt−1, yt−1, xt ] ≤ exp(λ2σ2/2), for all λ ∈ R.
6. Strongest bound on both the action and the reward: ‖xt ‖2 + y2t ≤ L˜2 for all rounds t. In
particular, if ‖xt ‖ ≤ L (Assumption 1) and the rewards are bounded: |yt | ≤ B˜ (not just their
means as in Assumption 2), we can set L˜2 = L2 + B˜2.
Assumptions 1 and 2 aren’t required to have good pseudo-regret bounds, they merely simplify the
bounds on the confidence set (see Proposition 4 and Section 3.1). Assumption 6 is not required at all
for now, it is only used for joint differential privacy in Section 4.
To fully describe Algorithm 1 we need to specify how to compute the confidence-set bounds (βt )t . On
the one hand, these bounds have to be accurate — the confidence set Et should contain the unknown
θ∗; on the other hand, the larger they are, the larger the regret bounds we obtain. In other words, the
βt should be as small as possible subject to being accurate.
Definition 2 (Accurate (βt )t ). A sequence (βt )nt=1 is (α, n)-accurate for (Ht )nt=1 and (ht )nt=1 if, with
probability at least 1 − α, it satisfies ‖θ∗ − θ˜t ‖Vt ≤ βt for all rounds t = 1, . . . , n simultaneously.
We now argue that three parameters are the key to establishing accurate confidence-set bounds
(βt )nt=1 — taking into account the noise in the setting and the noise added by a changing Ht and ht .
Definition 3 (Accurate ρmin, ρmax, and γ). The bounds 0 < ρmin ≤ ρmax and γ are (α/2n)-accurate
for (Ht )nt=1 and (ht )nt=1 if for each round t:
‖Ht ‖ ≤ ρmax, ‖H−1t ‖ ≤ 1/ρmin, ‖ht ‖H−1t ≤ γ; with probability at least 1 − α/2n.
Proposition 4 (Calculating βt ). Suppose Assumptions 3 to 5 hold and let ρmin, ρmax, and γ be
(α/2n)-accurate for some α ∈ (0, 1) and horizon n. Then (βt )nt=1 is (α, n)-accurate where
βt B σ
√
2 log(2/α) + log(detVt ) − d log(ρmin) + S√ρmax + γ
≤ σ
√
2 log(2/α) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ tL
2
dρmin
)
+ S
√
ρmax + γ. (if Assumption 1 also holds)
3.1 Regret Bounds
We now present bounds on the maximum regret of Algorithm 1. However, due to space constraints,
we defer an extensive discussion of the proof techniques used and the significance of the results to
Section B in the supplementary material. The proofs are based on those of Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [1],
who analyzed LinUCB with constant regularizers. On one hand, our changes are mostly technical;
however, it turns out that various parts of the proof diverge and now depend on ρmax and ρmin; tracing
them all is somewhat involved. It is an interesting question to establish similar bounds using known
results only as a black box; we were not able to accomplish this.
Theorem 5 (Regret of Algorithm 1). Suppose Assumptions 1 to 5 hold and the βt are as given by
Proposition 4. Then with probability at least 1 − α the pseudo-regret of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
R̂n ≤ B
√
8n
[
σ
(
2 log( 2α ) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ nL
2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 + nL2dρmin
)]
(2)
Theorem 6 (Gap-Dependent Regret of Algorithm 1). Suppose Assumptions 1 to 5 hold and the βt
are as given by Proposition 4. If the optimal actions in every decision set Dt are separated from the
sub-optimal actions by a reward gap of at least ∆, then with probability at least 1−α the pseudo-regret
of Algorithm 1 satisfies
R̂n ≤ 8B
∆
[
σ
(
2 log( 2α ) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ nL
2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 + nL2dρmin
)]2
(3)
2See Remark 2 preceding the proof of Lemma 21 in Section B of the supplementary material for a discussion
as to bounding B by 1 from below.
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4 Linear UCB with Joint Differential Privacy
Notice that Algorithm 1 uses its history of actions and rewards up to round t only via the confidence
set Et , which is to say via Vt and u˜t , which are perturbations of the Gram matrix Gt and the vector
ut B X><t y<t , respectively; these also determine βt . By recording this history with differential
privacy, we obtain a Linear UCB algorithm that is jointly differentially private (Definition 1) because
it simply post-processes Gt and ut .
Claim 7 (see Dwork and Roth [15, Proposition 2.1]). If the sequence (Vt, u˜t )n−1t=1 is (ε, δ)-differentially
private with respect to (xt, yt )n−1t=1 , then Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
Remark 1. Algorithm 1 is only jointly differentially private even though the history maintains full
differential privacy — its action choice depends not only on the past contexts cs (s < t, via the
differentially private X<t ) but also on the current context ct via the decision set Dt . This use of ct is
not differentially private, as it is revealed by the algorithm’s chosen xt .
Rather than applying the tree-based algorithm separately to Gt and ut , we aggregate both into the
single matrix Mt ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1), which we now construct. Define A B
[
X1:n y1:n
] ∈ Rn×(d+1),
with At holding the top t − 1 rows of A (and A1 = 01×(d+1)). Now let Mt B A>t At — then the
top-left d × d sub-matrix of Mt is the Gram matrix Gt and the first d entries of its last column
are ut . Furthermore, since Mt+1 = Mt +
[
x>t yt
]> [
x>t yt
]
, the tree-based algorithm for private
cumulative sums can be used to maintain a private estimation of Mt using additive noise, releasing
Mt + Nt . The top-left d × d sub-matrix of Nt becomes Ht and the first d entries of its last column
become ht . Lastly, to have a private estimation of Mt , Assumption 6 must hold.
Below we present two techniques for maintaining (and updating) the private estimations of Mt . As
mentioned in Section 1.3, the key component of our technique is the tree-based algorithm, allowing
us to estimate Mt using at most m B 1 + dlog2 ne noisy counters. In order for the entire tree-based
algorithm to be (ε, δ)-differentially private, we add noise to each node in the tree so that each noisy
count on its own preserves (ε/√8m ln(2/δ), δ/2m)-differential privacy. Thus in each day, the noise Nt that
we add to Mt comes from the sum of at most m such counters.
4.1 Differential Privacy via Wishart Noise
First, we instantiate the tree-based algorithm with noise from a suitably chosen Wishart distribution
Wd+1(V, k), which is the result of sampling k independent (d + 1)-dimensional Gaussians from
N(0d+1,V ) and computing their Gram matrix.
Theorem 8 (Theorem 4.1 [30]). Fix positive ε0 and δ0. If the L2-norm of each row in the input is
bounded by L˜ then releasing the input’s Gram matrix with added noise sampled fromWd+1(L˜2I, k0)
is (ε0, δ0)-differentially private, provided k0 ≥ d + 1 + 28ε−20 ln(4/δ0).
Applying this guarantee to our setting, where each count needs to preserve (ε/√8m ln(2/δ), δ/2m)-
differential privacy, it suffices to sample a matrix from Wd+1(L˜I, k) with k B d + 1 +
d224mε−2 ln(8m/δ) ln(2/δ)e. Moreover, the sum of m independent samples from the Wishart distri-
bution is a noise matrix Nt ∼ Wd+1(L˜2I,mk).3 Furthermore, consider the regularizers Ht and ht
derived from Nt (the top-left submatrix and the right-most subcolumn resp.) — Ht has distribution
Wd(L˜2I,mk), and each entry of ht is the dot-product of two multivariate Gaussians. Knowing their
distribution, we can infer the accurate bounds required for our regret bounds. Furthermore, since
the Wishart noise has eigenvalues that are fairly large, we consider a post-processing of the noise
matrix — shifting it by −cI with
c B L˜2
(√
mk −
√
d −
√
2 ln(8n/α))2 − 4L˜2√mk (√d + √2 ln(8n/α)) (4)
making the bounds we require smaller than without the shift. The derivations are deferred to Section C
of the supplementary material.
3Intuitively, we merely concatenate the m batches of multivariate Gaussians sampled in the generation of
each of the m Wishart noises.
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Proposition 9. Fix any α > 0. If for each t the Ht and ht are generated by the tree-based algorithm
with Wishart noiseWd+1(L˜2I, k), then the following are (α/2n)-accurate bounds:
ρmin = L˜2
(√
mk −
√
d −
√
2 ln(8n/α))2,
ρmax = L˜2
(√
mk +
√
d +
√
2 ln(8n/α))2,
γ = L˜
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) .
Moreover, if we use the shifted regularizer H ′t B Ht − cI with c as given in Eq. (4), then the following
are (α/2n)-accurate bounds:
ρ′min = 4L˜
2√mk (√d + √2 ln(8n/α)),
ρ′max = 8L˜2
√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(8n/α)),
γ′ = L˜
√√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) .
Plugging these into Theorems 5 and 6 gives us the following upper bounds on pseudo-regret.
Corollary 10. Algorithm 1 with Ht and ht generated by the tree-based mechanism with each node
adding noise independently fromWd+1((L2 + B˜2)I, k) and then subtracting cI using Eq. (4), we get
a pseudo-regret bound of
O
(
B
√
n
[
σ
(
log
(
1/α) + d log(n)) + SL˜√dlog(n)3/4(d1/4 + ε−1/2log(1/δ)1/4)(d1/4 + log(n/α)1/4)] )
in general, and a gap-dependent pseudo-regret bound of
O
(
B
∆
[
σ
(
log
(
1/α) + d log(n)) + SL˜√dlog(n)3/4(d1/4 + ε−1/2log(1/δ)1/4)(d1/4 + log(n/α)1/4)]2)
4.2 Differential Privacy via Additive Gaussian Noise
Our second alternative is to instantiate the tree-based algorithmwith symmetric Gaussian noise: sample
Z ′ ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1) with each Z ′i, j ∼ N(0, σ2noise) i.i.d. and symmetrize to get Z = (Z ′ + Z ′>)/
√
2.4
Recall that each datum has a bounded L2-norm of L˜, hence a change to a single datum may alter
the Frobenius norm of Mt by L˜2. It follows that in order to make sure each node in the tree-based
algorithm preserves (ε/√8m ln(2/δ), δ/2)-differential privacy,5 the variance in each coordinate must be
σ2noise = 16mL˜
4ln(4/δ)2/ε2. When all entries on Z are sampled from N(0, 1), known concentration
results [32] on the top singular value of Z give that P[‖Z ‖ > (4√d + 1 + 2 ln(2n/α))] < α/2n. Note
however that in each day t the noise Nt is the sum of ≤ m such matrices, thus the variance of each
coordinate is mσ2noise. The top-left (d × d)-submatrix of Nt has operator norm of at most
Υ B σnoise
√
2m
(
4
√
d + 2 ln(2n/α)) = √32mL˜2 ln(4/δ)(4√d + 2 ln(2n/α))/ε.
However, it is important to note that the result of adding Gaussian noise may not preserve the PSD
property of the noisy Gram matrix. To that end, we ought to shift Nt by some cI in order to make
sure that we maintain strictly positive eigenvalues throughout the execution of the algorithm. Since
the bounds in Theorems 5 and 6 mainly depend on √ρmax + γ, we choose the shift-magnitude to
be 2ΥI . This makes ρmax = 3Υ and ρmin = Υ and as a result ‖ht ‖H−1t ≤
√
Υ−1‖ht ‖, which we can
bound using standard concentration bounds on the χ2-distribution (see Claim 17). This culminates in
the following bounds.
Proposition 11. Fix any α > 0. Given that for each t the regularizers Ht, ht are taken by applying
the tree-based algorithm with symmetrized shifted Gaussian noise whose entries are sampled i.i.d.
from N(0, σ2noise), then the following ρmin, ρmax, and γ are (α/2n)-accurate bounds:
ρmin = Υ, ρmax = 3Υ, γ = σnoise
√
Υ−1m
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) ≤ √mL˜2 (√d + 2 ln(2n/α))/(√2ε)
4This increases the variance along the diagonal entries beyond the noise magnitude required to preserve
privacy, but only by a constant factor of 2.
5We use here the slightly better bounds for the composition of Gaussian noise based on zero-Concentrated
DP [9].
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Note how this choice of shift indeed makes both ρmax and γ2 roughly on the order of O(Υ).
The end result is that for each day t, ht is given by summing at most m d-dimensional vectors whose
entries are sampled i.i.d. fromN(0, σ2noise); the symmetrization doesn’t change the distribution of each
coordinate. The matrix Ht is given by: (i) summing at most m matrices whose entries are sampled
i.i.d. from N(0, σ2noise); (ii) symmetrizing the result as shown above; and (iii) adding 2ΥI . This leads
to a bound on the regret of Algorithm 1 with the tree-based algorithm using Gaussian noise.
Corollary 12. Applying Algorithm 1 where the regularizers Ht and ht are derived by applying the
tree-based algorithm where each node holds a symmetrized matrix whose entries are sampled i.i.d.
from N(0, σ2noise) and adding 2ΥI , we get a regret bound of
O
(
B
√
n
(
σ(d log(n) + log(1/α)) + SL˜ log(n)
√
d(
√
d + ln(n/α)) ln(1/δ)/ε
))
in general, and a gap-dependent pseudo-regret bound of
O
(
B
∆
(
σ(d log(n) + log(1/α)) + SL˜ log(n)
√
d(
√
d + ln(n/α)) ln(1/δ)/ε
)2)
5 Lower Bounds
In this section, we present lower bounds for two versions of the problem we deal with in this work. The
first, and probably the more obvious of the two, deals with the impossibility of obtaining sub-linear
regret for the contextual bandit problem with the standard notion of differential privacy (under
continual observation). Here, we assume user t provides a context ct which actually determines the
mapping of the arms into feature vectors: φ(ct, a) ∈ Rd. The sequence of choice thus made by the
learner is a1, . . . , an ∈ An which we aim to keep private. The next claim, whose proof is deferred to
Section C in the supplementary material, shows that this is impossible without effectively losing any
reasonable notion of utility.
Claim 13. For any ε < ln(2) and δ < 0.25, any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm A for the
contextual bandit problem must incur pseudo-regret of Ω(n).
The second lower bound we show is more challenging. We show that any ε-differentially private
algorithm for the classic MAB problem must incur an additional pseudo-regret of Ω(k log(n)/)
on top of the standard (non-private) regret bounds. We consider an instance of the MAB where
the leading arm is a1, the rewards are drawn from a distribution over {−1, 1}, and the gap between
the means of arm a1 and arm a , a1 is ∆a. Simple calculation shows that for such distributions,
the total-variation distance between two distributions whose means are µ and µ − ∆ is ∆/2. Fix
∆2,∆3, . . . ,∆k as some small constants, and we now argue the following.
Claim 14. Let A be any ε-differentially private algorithm for the MAB problems with k arms whose
expected regret is at most n3/4. Fix any arm a , a1, whose difference between it and the optimal arm
a1 is ∆a. Then, for sufficiently large ns, A pulls arm a at least log(n)/100ε∆a many times w.p. ≥ 1/2.
We comment that the bound n3/4 was chosen arbitrarily, and we only require a regret upper bound
of n1−c for some c > 0. Of course, we could have used standard assumptions, where the regret is
asymptotically smaller than any polynomial; or discuss algorithms of regret O˜(√n) (best minimax
regret). Aiming to separate the standard lower-bounds on regret from the private bounds, we decided
to use n3/4. As an immediate corollary we obtain the following private regret bound:
Corollary 15. The expected pseudo-regret of any ε-differentially private algorithm for the MAB is
Ω(k log(n)/ε). Combined with the non-private bound of Ω(∑a,a1 log(n)/∆a ) we get that the private
regret bound is the max of the two terms, i.e.: Ω
(
k log(n)/ε +∑a,a1 log(n)/∆a ) .
Proof. Based on Claim 14, the expected pseudo-regret is at least
∑
a,a1
∆a log(n)
200ε∆a =
(k−1) log(n)
200ε . 
Proof of Claim 14. Fix arm a. Let P¯ be the vector of the k-probability distributions associated with
the k arms. Denote E as the event that arm a is pulled < log(n)/100ε∆a := ta many times. Our goal is
to show that PA; rewards∼P¯[E] < 1/2.
To that end, we postulate a different distribution for the rewards of arm a — a new distribution whose
mean is greater by ∆a than the mean reward of arm a1. The total-variation distance between the
given distribution and the postulated distribution is ∆a. Denote Q¯ as the vector of distributions of
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arm-rewards (where only Pa , Qa). We now argue that should the rewards be drawn from Q¯, then
the event E is very unlikely: PA; rewards∼Q¯[E] ≤ 2n−1/4/∆a. Indeed, the argument is based on a
standard Markov-like argument: the expected pseudo-regret of A is at most n3/4, yet it is at least
PA; rewards∼Q¯[E] · (n − ta)∆a ≥ (n∆a/2)PA; rewards∼Q¯[E], for sufficiently large n.
We now apply a beautiful result of Karwa and Vadhan [22, Lemma 6.1], stating that the “effective”
group privacy between the case where the n datums of the inputs are drawn i.i.d. from either
distribution P or from distribution Q is proportional to εn · dTV(P,Q). In our case, the key point is
that we only consider this change under the event E , thus the number of samples we need to redraw
from the distribution Pa rather than Qa is strictly smaller than ta, and the elegant coupling argument
of [22] reduces it to 6∆a · ta. To better illustrate the argument, consider the coupling argument of [22]
as an oracle O. The oracle generates a collection of precisely ta pairs of points, the left ones are
i.i.d. samples from Pa and the right ones are i.i.d. samples from Qa, and, in expectation, in (1 − ∆a)
fraction of the pairs the right- and the left-samples are identical. Whenever the learner A pulls arm a
it makes an oracle call to O, and depending on the environment (whether the distribution of rewards
is P¯ or Q¯) O provides either a fresh left-sample or a right-sample. Moreover, suppose there exists a
counter C that stands between A and O, and in case O runs out of examples then C routes A’s oracle
calls to a different oracle. Now, Karwa and Vadhan [22, Lemma 6.1] assures that the probability
of the event “C never re-routes the requests” happens with similar probability under P or under Q,
different only up to a multiplicative factor of exp(∆ata). And seeing as the event “C never re-routes
the requests” is quite unlikely when O only provides right-samples (from Q¯), it is also fairly unlikely
when O only provides left-samples (from P¯).
Formally, we conclude the proof by applying the result of [22] to infer that PA; rewards∼P¯[E] ≤
exp(6ε∆ata)PA; rewards∼Q¯[E] ≤ exp(0.06 log(n)) · 2∆a n−1/4 = n−0.19 2∆a ≤ 1/2 for sufficiently large ns,
proving the required claim. 
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Supplementary Material
A Additional Background Information
A.1 Differential Privacy
In the offline setting, a dataset D is a n-tuple of elements from some universeU. Two datasets are
called neighbors if they differ just on a single element. An algorithm A is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′ and any subset of possible outputs S we have
that P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ. A common technique [16] for approximating the value of
a query f on dataset D is to first find its L2-sensitivity, GS2 := maxD,D′ neighboring ‖ f (D) − f (D′)‖2,
and then add Gaussian noise of 0-mean and variance 2GS
2
2 ln(2/δ)
ε2
.
A.2 The Tree-Based Mechanism
Assume for simplicity that n = 2i for some positive integer i. Let T be a complete binary tree with its
leaf nodes being l1, . . . , ln. Each internal node x ∈ T stores the sum of all the leaf nodes in the tree
rooted at x. First notice that one can compute any partial sum
∑i
j=1 li using at most m := dlog(n) + 1e
nodes of T . Second, notice that for any two neighbor- ing data sequences D and D′ the partial
sums stored at no more than m nodes in T are different. Thus, if the count in each node preserves
(ε0, δ0)-differential privacy, using the advanced composition of [14] we get that the entire algorithm
is
(
O(mε20 + ε0
√
2m ln(1/δ′)),mδ0 + δ′
)
-differentially private. Alternatively, to make sure the entire
tree is (ε, δ)-differentially private, it suffices to set ε0 = ε/
√
8m ln(2/δ) and δ0 = δ2m (with δ′ = δ/2).
A.3 Useful Facts.
In this work, we repeatedly apply the following facts about PSD matrices, the Gaussian distribution,
the χ2-distribution and the Wishart-distribution.
Claim 16 (36, Theorem 7.8). If A  B  0, then
1. rank(A) ≥ rank(B)
2. det A ≥ det B
3. B−1  A−1 if A and B are nonsingular.
Claim 17 (Corollary to Lemma 1, 25, p. 1325). If U ∼ χ2(d) and α ∈ (0, 1),
P
(
U ≥ d + 2
√
d ln 1α + 2 ln
1
α
)
≤ α, P
(
U ≤ d − 2
√
d ln 1α
)
≤ α.
Claim 18 (Adaptation of 35, Corollary 5.35). Let A be an n× d matrix whose entries are independent
standard normal variables. Then for every α ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − α it holds that
σmin(A), σmax(A) ∈
√
n ± (
√
d +
√
2 ln(2/α))
with σmin(A) and σmax(A) denoting the smallest- and largest singular values of A resp.
Claim 19 (30, Lemma A.3). Fix α ∈ (0, 1/e) and letW ∼ Wd(V, k) with √m >
√
d +
√
2 ln(2/α).
Then, denoting the j-t largest eigenvalue ofW as σj(W ), with probability at least 1 − α it holds that
for every j = 1, 2, . . . , d:
σj(W ) ∈
(√
m ±
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2/α)
))2
σj(V ).
Claim 20. For any matrix H  ρI  0, vector v, and constant c ≥ 0 satisfying H − cI  0,
‖v‖(H−cI )−1 ≤ ‖v‖H−1
√
ρ
ρ − c .
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Proof. Since 0 ≺ ρI  H , an application of Claim 16 gives
cI  (c/ρ)H multiplying by c/ρ ≥ 0
H − cI  H − (c/ρ)H =
(
ρ − c
ρ
)
H
(H − cI )−1 
(
ρ
ρ − c
)
H−1.
The result follows from the definition of ‖v‖H−1 . 
B Discussion and Proofs from Section 3
The proofs in this section are based on those of Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [1], who analyze the LinUCB
algorithm with a constant regularizer. The main difference from that work is that, in our case,
quantities involving the regularizer must be bounded above or below (as appropriate) by the constants
ρmax and ρmin, respectively. We will make extensive use of Claim 16, which shows that for any two
matrices 0  V  U , we have detV ≤ detU and V−1  U−1. We start by proving the following
proposition about the sizes of the confidence ellipsoids, which illustrates this general idea.
Proposition 4 (Calculating βt ). Suppose Assumptions 3 to 5 hold and let ρmin, ρmax, and γ be
(α/2n)-accurate for some α ∈ (0, 1) and horizon n. Then (βt )nt=1 is (α, n)-accurate where
βt B σ
√
2 log(2/α) + log(detVt ) − d log(ρmin) + S√ρmax + γ
≤ σ
√
2 log(2/α) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ tL
2
dρmin
)
+ S
√
ρmax + γ. (if Assumption 1 also holds)
Proof. By definition, θ˜t = V−1t u˜t , u˜t = ut + ht , and ut = X><t y<t , so that
θ∗ − θ˜t = θ∗ − V−1t (X><t y<t + ht )
= θ∗ − V−1t (X><tX<tθ∗ + X><tηt−1 + ht ) since y<t = X<tθ∗ + ηt−1
= θ∗ − V−1t (Vtθ∗ − Htθ∗ + zt + ht ) defining zt B X><tηt−1
= V−1t (Htθ∗ − zt − ht )
Multiplying both sides by V 1/2t gives
V 1/2t (θ∗ − θ˜t ) = V−1/2t (Htθ∗ − zt − ht )
‖θ∗ − θ˜t ‖Vt = ‖Htθ∗ − zt − ht ‖V−1t applying ‖ · ‖ to both sides
≤ ‖Htθ∗‖V−1t + ‖zt ‖V−1t + ‖ht ‖V−1t triangle inequality
≤ ‖ zt ‖V−1t + ‖Htθ
∗‖H−1t + ‖ht ‖H−1t by Claim 16 since Vt  Ht
= ‖ zt ‖(Gt+ρminI )−1 + ‖θ∗‖Ht + ‖ht ‖H−1t , since Vt  Gt + ρminI .
We use a union bound over all n rounds to bound ‖θ∗‖Ht ≤
√‖Ht ‖‖θ∗‖ ≤ S√ρmax and ‖ht ‖H−1t ≤ γ
with probability at least 1−α/2. Finally, by the “self-normalized bound for vector-valued martingales”
of Abbasi-Yadkori et al. [1, Theorem 1], with probability 1 − α/2 for all rounds simultaneously
‖ zt ‖(Gt+ρminI )−1 ≤ σ
√
2 log
2
α
+ log
det(Gt + ρminI )
det ρminI
≤ σ
√
2 log
2
α
+ log detVt − d log ρmin.
It only remains to show the upper-bound on each βt . By Claim 16, we have detVt = det(Gt + Ht ) ≤
det(Gt + ρmaxI ) and
log detVt ≤ log det(Gt + ρmaxI ) ≤ d log(ρmax + tL2/d).
using the trace-determinant inequality as in the proof of Lemma 22. All the βt are therefore bounded
by the constants
β¯t B σ
√
2 log
2
α
+ d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+
tL2
dρmin
)
+ S
√
ρmax + γ. 
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We now take our first steps towards a regret bound by giving a “generic” version that depends only
on LinUCB taking “optimistic” actions, the sizes of the confidence sets, and the rewards being
bounded. We rely upon the upper bound for each βt shown in the previous proposition. We use
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to bound the sum of per-round regrets rt by
∑
r2t ; this results in the
leading O(√n) factor in the regret bound. Our gap-dependent analysis later avoids this, but has other
trade-offs.
Lemma 21 (Generic LinUCB Regret). Suppose Assumptions 2 and 4 hold (i.e. |〈θ∗, x〉| ≤ B and all
Ht  0) and β¯n ≥ max{β1, . . . , βn, 1}; also assume that B = 1. If all the confidence sets Et contain
θ∗ (i.e., ‖θ∗ − θ˜t ‖Vt ≤ βt ), then the pseudo-regret of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
R̂n ≤ β¯n
√
4n
n∑
t=1
min{1, ‖xt ‖2V−1t }.
Remark 2 (On the quantity B appearing in Assumption 2). For the following proofs, we assume (as in
this lemma) that Assumption 2 holds with B = 1. Eventually, however, our regret bounds end up
with a factor B; we now explain how. First note that B is trivially at most LS by Cauchy-Schwarz:
|〈θ∗, xt〉| ≤ ‖θ∗‖‖xt ‖ ≤ LS. The case where B < 1 yet is some constant is trivial: clearly we can
take B = 1 without violating the assumption. The case where B = o(1) is actually quite intricate
and somewhat “unnatural”: while a-priori we know the mean-reward can be as large as LS, it is in
fact much smaller. This means we have to scale down actions, and shrink the entire problem by a
sub-constant; and as a result the noise σ is actually now far larger (it is like σ/B in the original
setting). While this can be a mere technicality in general, since our leading application is privacy this
also means that the bounds on the actual reward we use in Section 4 needs to be scaled by a very large
factor. Thus, allowing for ridiculously small B turns into an unnecessary nuisance, and we simply
assume that our upper-bound B is not tiny — namely, we assume B ≥ 1.
It remains to deal with the situation where B > 1. In this case, we can pre-process the rewards to the
algorithm, scaling them down by a factor of B. If we also scale down all the actions x ∈ Dt , then
the rest of the assumptions remain inviolate and the regret bound for B = 1 applies. However, this
bounds the regret in the scaled problem: in the original problem the rewards and hence regret must be
scaled up by a factor of B. Note that by only scaling theDt , we are not modifying any quantities used
in the actual algorithm, just the regret bound; this would not be true if we scaled θ∗ (whose maximum
norm appears in the βt ), which is the other possibility to maintain the linearity of rewards.
Indeed, in the scaled-down problem the regret is somewhat lower than the bound because both L and
σ can be scaled down by B (the noise variance scales proportionally to the reward). For simplicity,
however, we refrain from replacing L and σ in the upper bound with L/B and σ/B, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 21. At every round t, Algorithm 1 selects an “optimistic” action xt satisfying
(xt, θ¯t ) ∈ arg max
(x,θ)∈Dt×Et
〈θ, x〉. (5)
Let x∗t ∈ arg maxx∈Dt 〈θ∗, x〉 be an optimal action and rt = 〈θ∗, x∗t − xt〉 be the immediate pseudo-
regret suffered for round t:
rt = 〈θ∗, x∗t 〉 − 〈θ∗, xt〉
≤ 〈θ¯t, xt〉 − 〈θ∗, xt〉 from (5) since (x∗t , θ∗) ∈ Dt × Et
= 〈θ¯t − θ∗, xt〉
= 〈V 1/2t (θ¯t − θ∗),V−1/2t xt〉 since Vt  Ht  0
≤ ‖θ¯t − θ∗‖Vt ‖xt ‖V−1t by Cauchy-Schwarz
≤ (‖θ¯t − θ˜t ‖Vt + ‖θ∗ − θ˜t ‖Vt ) ‖xt ‖V−1t by the triangle inequality
≤ 2βt ‖xt ‖V−1t since θ¯t, θ
∗ ∈ Et
≤ 2β¯n‖xt ‖V−1t since β¯n ≥ βt .
From our assumptions that the mean absolute reward is at most 1 and β¯n ≥ 1, we also get that
rt ≤ 2 ≤ 2β¯n. Putting these together,
rt ≤ 2β¯n min{1, ‖xt ‖V−1t } (6)
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Now we apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, since R̂n = 〈1n, r/n〉, where 1n is the all-ones vector
and r is the vector of per-round regrets:
R̂2n = n
2
( n∑
t=1
rt
n
)2
≤ n2
n∑
t=1
r2t
n
= n
n∑
t=1
rt2 ≤ 4nβ¯2n
n∑
t=1
min{1, ‖xt ‖2V−1t }.
Taking square roots completes the proof. 
The following technical lemma relates the quantity from the previous result to the volume (i.e.
determinant) of the Vn matrix. We will see shortly that the Ut are all lower bounds on the Vt .
Lemma 22 (Elliptical Potential). Let x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rd be vectors with each ‖xt ‖ ≤ L. Given a
positive definite matrix U1 ∈ Rd×d , define Ut+1 B Ut + xt x>t for all t. Then
n∑
t=1
min{1, ‖xt ‖2U−1t } ≤ 2 log
detUn+1
detU1
≤ 2d log trU1 + nL
2
d det1/d U1
.
Proof. We use the fact that min{1, u} ≤ 2 log(1 + u) for any u ≥ 0:
n∑
t=1
min{1, ‖xt ‖2U−1t } ≤ 2
n∑
t=1
log(1 + ‖xt ‖2U−1t ).
We will show that this last summation is 2 log(detUn+1/detUn). For all t, we have
Ut+1 = Ut + xt x>t = U
1/2
t
(
I +U−1/2t xt x
>
t U
−1/2
t
)
U1/2t
detUt+1 = detUt det
(
I +U−1/2t xt x
>
t U
−1/2
t
)
.
Consider the eigenvectors of the matrix I + y y> for an arbitrary vector y ∈ Rd . We know that y itself
is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 + ‖y‖2:
(I + y y>)y = y + y〈y, y〉 = (1 + ‖y‖2)y.
Moreover, since I + y y> is symmetric, every other eigenvector u is orthogonal to y, so that
(I + y y>)u = u + u〈y, u〉 = u.
Therefore the only eigenvalues of I + y y> are 1 + ‖y‖2 (with eigenvector y) and 1. In our case
y = U−1/2t xt and ‖y‖2 = x>t U−1t xt = ‖xt ‖2U−1t , so we get our first inequality:
detUn+1 = detU1
n∏
t=1
(1 + ‖xt ‖2U−1t )
2 log
detUn+1
detU1
= 2
n∑
t=1
log(1 + ‖xt ‖2U−1t ).
To get the second inequality, we apply the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality to the eigenvalues λi
of Un:
detUn =
d∏
i=1
λi ≤
( 1
d
d∑
i=1
λi
)d
= ((1/d) trUn)d ≤ ((trU1 + nL2)/d)d
2 log
detUn
detU1
≤ 2d log trU1 + nL
2
d det1/d U1

We are finally in a position to prove the main regret theorem. The proof is straightforward and
essentially comes down to plugging in our preceding results.
Theorem 5 (Regret of Algorithm 1). Suppose Assumptions 1 to 5 hold and the βt are as given by
Proposition 4. Then with probability at least 1 − α the pseudo-regret of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
R̂n ≤ B
√
8n
[
σ
(
2 log( 2α ) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ nL
2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 + nL2dρmin
)]
(2)
Proof. We restrict ourselves to the event that all the confidence ellipsoids contain θ∗ and all
ρminI  Ht  ρmaxI . Proposition 4 assures us that this happens with probability at least 1 − α, and
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furthermore gives us the bound βt ≤ β¯n:
β¯n B σ
√
2 log
2
α
+ d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+
nL2
dρmin
)
+ S
√
ρmax + γ.
Next, we have ‖xt ‖V−1t ≤ ‖xt ‖(Gt+ρminI )−1 , which applied to the result of Lemma 21 gives, using
Lemma 22
R̂n ≤ β¯n
√
8dn log
(
1 +
nL2
dρmin
)
≤
√
8n
σ
(
2 log
2
α
+ d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+
nL2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 +
nL2
dρmin
) .
The argument outlined in Remark 2 preceding the proof of Lemma 21 tells us how to reintroduce the
missing factor of B in this regret bound. 
The proof of the gap-dependent regret bound diverges from the previous proof in only one major way:
the gap is used to bound each rt by r2t /∆. Then the sum of r2t is bounded as before; this avoids the
√
n
factor introduced by the use of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 6 (Gap-Dependent Regret of Algorithm 1). Suppose Assumptions 1 to 5 hold and the βt
are as given by Proposition 4. If the optimal actions in every decision set Dt are separated from the
sub-optimal actions by a reward gap of at least ∆, then with probability at least 1−α the pseudo-regret
of Algorithm 1 satisfies
R̂n ≤ 8B
∆
[
σ
(
2 log( 2α ) + d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+ nL
2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 + nL2dρmin
)]2
(3)
Proof. Because of the gap assumption, for every round t if the per-round pseudo-regret rt , 0 then
rt ≥ ∆. We use this fact to decompose the regret in a different way than we did in Lemma 21. The
rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. As before, see Remark 2 preceding the proof of
Lemma 21 to introduce the missing B factor.
R̂n =
∑
t∈Bn
rt ≤
∑
t∈Bn
r2t
∆
≤ 4
∆
β¯2n
∑
t∈Bn
min{1, ‖xt ‖2V−1t } from (6)
≤ 8
∆
β¯2nd log
(
1 +
nL2
dρmin
)
≤ 8
∆
σ
(
2 log
2
α
+ d log
(
ρmax
ρmin
+
nL2
dρmin
))
+ (S√ρmax + γ)
√
d log
(
1 +
nL2
dρmin
)
2

B.1 Regret Bounds Open Problem
The first conclusion from these regret bounds is that allowing changing regularizers does not incur
significant additional regret, as long as they are bounded both above and below. Broadly speaking,
these bounds for contextual linear bandits match those for standard MAB algorithms in terms of
their dependence on n and ∆— just like with UCB, for example, the minimax bound is O(√n) and
the gap-dependent bound is O(log(n)/∆). However, the dependence on d (which corresponds to
the number of arms for the MAB) is much worse, with O(d) in the minimax case and O(d2) in the
gap-dependent case.
It is an interesting open question whether the O(d2) dependence on d is necessary to achieve O(log n)
gap-dependent regret bounds. As we were unable to prove a lower bound of Ω(d2), we resorted to
empirically checking the performance of the (non-private) LinUCB on such ∆-gap instances; the
results can be found in Section D.1.
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C Privacy Proofs
We now provide the missing privacy proofs from the main body of the paper. First, we give the
omitted proof from Section 4.1.
Proposition 9. Fix any α > 0. If for each t the Ht and ht are generated by the tree-based algorithm
with Wishart noiseWd+1(L˜2I, k), then the following are (α/2n)-accurate bounds:
ρmin = L˜2
(√
mk −
√
d −
√
2 ln(8n/α))2,
ρmax = L˜2
(√
mk +
√
d +
√
2 ln(8n/α))2,
γ = L˜
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) .
Moreover, if we use the shifted regularizer H ′t B Ht − cI with c as given in Eq. (4), then the following
are (α/2n)-accurate bounds:
ρ′min = 4L˜
2√mk (√d + √2 ln(8n/α)),
ρ′max = 8L˜2
√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(8n/α)),
γ′ = L˜
√√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) .
Proof. Seeing as Ht ∼ Wd(L˜2I,mk), straight-forward bounds on the eigenvalues of the Wishart
distribution (e.g. [30], Lemma A.3) give that w.p. ≥ 1 − α/2n all of the eigenvalues of Ht lie in the
interval L˜2
(√
mk ± (√d + √2 ln(8n/α)) )2. To bound ‖ht ‖H−1t we draw back to the definition of the
Wishart distribution as the Gram matrix of samples from a multivariate Gaussian N(0, L˜2I ). Denote
this matrix of Gaussians as [Z; z] where Z ∈ Rmk×d and z ∈ Rmk , and we have that Ht = Z>Z
and ht = Z> z, thus ‖ht ‖H−1t =
√
z>Z(Z>Z)−1Z> z. The matrix Z(Z>Z)−1Z> is a projection matrix
onto a d-dimensional space, and projecting the spherical Gaussian z onto this subspace results in a
d-dimensional spherical Gaussian. Using concentration bounds on the χ2-distribution (Claim 17) we
have that w.p. ≥ 1 − α/2n it holds that ‖ht ‖H−1t ≤ γ B L˜
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) .
It is straightforward to modify these bounds for the shifted regularizer matrix H ′t B Ht − cI ; the
minimum and maximum eigenvalues are bounded as ρ′min = ρmin−c and ρ′max = ρmax−c, respectively.
The value of c in Eq. (4) is chosen so that ρ′min = ρmin−c = ρmax− ρmin = 4L˜2
√
mk(√d+√2 ln(8n/α)).
It follows that ρ′max = ρmax − c = ρ′min + ρmax − ρmin = 2ρ′min. Finally, Claim 20 gives
‖ht ‖H′−1t ≤ ‖ht ‖H−1t
√
ρmin/ρ′min ≤ γ
√
ρmin/ρ′min
= L˜
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α))√√ L˜2 (√mk − √d − √2 ln(8n/α))2
4L˜2
√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(8n/α))
≤ L˜
(√
mk − √d − √2 ln(8n/α))√√d + √2 ln(2n/α)
4(mk)1/4
≤ L˜
√√
mk
(√
d +
√
2 ln(2n/α)) C γ′ 
Theorem 23 (30, Theorem 4.1). Fix ε ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1/e). Let A ∈ Rn×p be a matrix whose
rows have l2-norm bounded by L˜. Let W be a matrix sampled from the d-dimensional Wishart
distribution with k degrees of freedom using the scale matrix L˜2Ip (i.e. W ∼ Wp(L˜2Ip, k)) for
k ≥ p + ⌊ 14
ε2
· 2 log(4/δ)⌋ . Then outputting A>A + N is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to
changing a single row of A.
We now give the proof of the lower bound of any private algorithm under the standard notion of
differential privacy under continual observation, as discussed in Section 5. First, of course, we need to
define this notion. Formally, two sequences S = 〈(c1, y1), . . . , (cn, yn)〉 and S′ = 〈(c′1, y′1), . . . , (c′n, y′n)〉
are called neighbors if there exists a single t such that for any t ′ , t we have (ct′, yt′) = (c′t′, y′t′); and
an algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for any two neighboring sequences S and S′ and any
subsets of sequences of actions S ⊂ An it holds that P[A(S) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[A(S′) ∈ S] + δ. We now
prove the following.
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Claim 13. For any ε < ln(2) and δ < 0.25, any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm A for the
contextual bandit problem must incur pseudo-regret of Ω(n).
Proof. We consider a setting with two arms A = {a1, a2} and two possible contexts: c1 which maps
a1 7→ θ∗ and a2 7→ −θ∗; and c2 which flips the mapping. Assuming ‖θ∗‖ = 1 it is evident we incur a
pseudo-regret of 2 when pulling arm a1 is under context c2 or pulling arm a2 under c1. Fix a day t and
a history of previous inputs and arm pulls Ht−1. Consider a pair of neighboring sequences that agree
on the history Ht−1 and differ just on day t — in S the context ct = c1 whereas in S′ it is set as ct = c2.
Denote S as the subset of action sequences that are fixed on the first t − 1 days according to Ht−1, have
the t-th action be a1 and on days > t may have any action. Thus, applying the guarantee of differential
privacy w.r.t to S we get that P[at = a1 | S] = P[A(S) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[at = a1 | S′] + δ. Consider an
adversary that sets the context of day t to be either c1 or c2 uniformly at random and independently
of other days. The pseudo-regret incurred on day t is thus: 2 · 12
(
P[at = a2 | S] + P[at = a1 | S′]
) ≥
(1−P[at = a1 | S])+ e−ε(P[at = a1 | S] − δ) = 1+ (e−ε −1)P[at = a2 | S] − δ > 1−1 · 12 − 14 = 14 . As
the above applies to any day t, the algorithm’s pseudo-regret is ≥ n4 against such random adversary. 
D Experiments
We performed some experiments with synthetic data to characterize the performance of the algorithms
in this paper.
Setting. We first describe the common setting used for all the experiments: Given a dimension d,
we first select θ∗ to be a random unit vector in Rd (distributed uniformly on the hyper-sphere, so that
S = 1). Then we construct decision sets of size K (K = d2 in our experiments), consisting of one
optimal action and K − 1 suboptimal actions, all of unit length (so L = 1). The optimal action is
chosen uniformly at random from the (d−2)-dimensional set {x ∈ Rd | ‖x‖ = 1, 〈x, θ∗〉 = 0.75}. The
suboptimal actions are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the (d − 1)-dimensional
set {x ∈ Rd | ‖x‖ = 1, 〈x, θ∗〉 ∈ [−0.75, 0.65]}. This results in a suboptimality gap of ∆ = 0.1,
since the optimal arm has mean reward 0.75 and the suboptimal arms have mean rewards in the
[−0.75, 0.65] interval. To simulate the contextual bandit setting, a new decision set is sampled before
each round.
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Figure 1: An example decision set in R3 with K = 1000 actions.
The rewards are either −1 or +1, with probabilities chosen so that E[yt ] = 〈xt, θ∗〉. Therefore B˜ = 1
and, being bounded in the [−1, 1] interval, the reward distribution is subgaussian with σ2 = 1.
The experiments below measure the expected regret in each case; the confidence parameter is α = 1/n,
which is the usual choice when one wishes to minimize expected regret.
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 — Regret over time for varying dimensions.
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Figure 3: Experiment 1 — Regret vs. dimension with log–log axes and best-fit line.
D.1 The Dependency of the Pseudo-Regret on the Dimension for Gap Instances
The first experiment was aimed at the open question of Section B.1, namely whether the gap-dependent
regret is Ω(d2) in the dimension of the problem. Thus privacy wasn’t a concern in this particular
setting; rather, our goal was to determine the performance of our general recipe algorithm in a
contextual setting with a clear-cut gap. We measured the pseudo-regret of the non-private LinUCB
algorithm as a function of the dimension over n = 105 rounds with the regularizer ρ = Id×d and
K = d2 arms. The values of d were logarithmically spaced in the interval [4, 64]. The results of the
experiment are plotted in Fig. 2. The two sub-experiments differ only in the reward noise distribution
used. In the first, the reward noise is truly a Gaussian with σ2 = 1, whereas in the second the reward
is ±1 as described above (subgaussian with σ2 = 1). In the latter case, the actual variance in the
reward depends on its expectation, and is somewhat lower than 1. This is perhaps why the regret is
somewhat lower than with gaussian reward noise.
Figure 3 shows the same results with total accumulated regret plotted against dimension using a
log–log scale. The best-fit line on this plot has a slope of roughly 2, clearly pointing to a super-linear
dependency on d. We conjecture that, in general, the dependency on d is indeed quadratic.
D.2 Empirical Performance of the Privacy-Preserving Algorithms over Time
This experiment compares the expected regret of the various algorithm variants presented in this
paper. The two major privacy-preserving algorithms are based on Wishart noise (Section 4.1) and
Gaussian noise (Section 4.2); both were run with privacy parameters ε = 1.0 and δ = 0.1 over a
horizon of n = 5 × 107 rounds and dimension d = 5 and K = d2 = 25. The results are shown in
Fig. 4; the curves are truncated after 2 × 107 rounds because they are essentially flat after this point.
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Figure 4: Experiment 2 — Regret over time, with and without forced sub-optimality gaps.
The sub-figures of Fig. 4 show two settings that differ in the sub-optimality gap ∆ between the
rewards of the optimal and sub-optimal arms. In the left sub-figure, the algorithms are run in a setting
without a structured gap (∆ = 0), where we have not forced all arms to be strictly separated from
the optimal arm by a large reward gap. Here, all sub-optimal arms are distributed uniformly on
the set {x ∈ Rd | ‖x‖ = 1, 〈x, θ∗〉 ∈ [−0.75, 0.75]} (and not from [−0.75, 0.65] as in the previous
experiment). Note that while we cannot guarantee that in all rounds there exists a gap between the
optimal and sub-optimal arms, it is still true that in expectation we should observe a gap of Θ(1/K)
between the optimal arm and the second-best arm (and as K = 25 this expected gap is, still, a constant
in comparison to n). In the right sub-figure, however, the sub-optimal arms are indeed separated by a
gap of ∆ = 0.1 from the optimal arms; their rewards lie in the interval [−0.75, 0.65] as in the previous
experiment. In both cases there is always an optimal arm with reward 0.75.
The figures show the following algorithm variants:
• The NonPrivate algorithm is LinUCB with regularizer ρ = 1.0. Its regret is too small to
be distinguished from the x-axis in this plot.
• The Gaussian variant is described in Section 4.2.
• The Wishart variant is described in Section 4.1 with the shift given in Eq. (4).
• The WishartUnshifted variant is that of Section 4.1 but with no shift.
Results. It is apparent that, at least for this setting, the Gaussian noise algorithm outperforms
Wishart noise. This shows that while the asymptotic performance of the two algorithms is fairly close,
the constants in the Gaussian version of the algorithm are far better than the ones in the Wishart-noise
based algorithm.
Furthermore, the performance of the WishartUnshifted variant changes significantly between the
two cases — it has the worst regret in the no-gap setting (∆ = 0) but, surprisingly, it is statistically
indistinguishable from the shifted Wishart variant in the large gap instance (∆ = 0.1). We investigate
this relationship between the sub-optimality gap and shifted regularizers in the next experiment.
D.3 Empirical Performance of Shifted Regularizers for Different Suboptimality Gaps
In both the Wishart and Gaussian variants of our algorithm, we use a shifted regularization matrix
Ht ± cI , choosing the shift parameter c to approximately optimize our regret bound in each case.
This optimal shift parameter turns out not to depend on the sub-optimality gap ∆ of the problem
instance. The previous experiment showed, however, that in practice the relative performance of the
shifted and unshifted Wishart variants changes drastically depending on the gap. In this experiment,
we investigate the impact of varying the shift parameter for the Wishart and Gaussian mechanisms
under different sub-optimality gaps ∆.
All the parameters are the same as the previous experiment— the only difference is the shift parameter;
the results are shown in Fig. 5. The two sub-figures show the performance of the Wishart and Gaussian
variants, respectively. The x-axis is a logarithmic scale indicating ρmin, the high-probability lower
bound on the minimum eigenvalue of the shifted regularizer matrix. ρmin serves as a good proxy for
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Figure 5: Experiment 3 — Varying shift parameters with different sub-optimality gaps.
the shift parameter because changing one has the effect of shifting the other by the same amount; it
has the added benefit of being meaningfully comparable amongst the different algorithm variants.
The vertical dotted lines indicate the ρmin values corresponding to the algorithms from Sections 4.1
and 4.2 for the Wishart and Gaussian variants, respectively; these are also the algorithms examined in
the previous experiment. The Gaussian mechanism does not have an unshifted variant.
Results. Tuning the shift parameter appears to significantly affect the performance only for problem
instances with relatively small or zero sub-optimality gaps. In the large-gap settings, on the other
hand, having too much regularization does not seem to increase regret appreciably. The small-gap
settings are exactly those in which exploration is crucial, so we conjecture that large regularizers
inhibit exploration and thereby incur increased regret.
21
